In connection with the increase in public debt induced by the growth of government expenditures aimed at reducing negative effects of the global pandemic, the analysis of such policy measures as fiscal consolidation is an urgent issue. In this paper, we analyze gains and losses of fiscal consolidation aimed at gradually reducing government debt to pre-pandemic levels by raising taxes. Within the framework of the global multi-regional general equilibrium model with overlapping generations (CGE-OLG), we consider scenarios of local (single region) and global consolidation. As a result, we have found that local consolidation leads to insignificant losses in terms of output in the Russian economy in the short term and to more significant losses in developed countries, whose budgetary expenditures were significantly higher during the pandemic. In the long run, there is a positive effect on the level of output in all economies. Another important result is the additional positive effect of global consolidation giving higher output values compared to local consolidation.

The paper examines the sectoral and macroeconomic effects of the increase in the VAT rate and the additional increase in government spending. For this porpoise, the computable general equilibrium model of the Russian economy has been developed. We have found that the VAT rate hike leads to the output decrease in most industries, including the manufacturing sector. Despite the positive macroeconomic effect from the government spending increases, the sectoral structure is deteriorating, and there is not enough additional growth in demand to offset the negative effect of the increase in the VAT rate, in particular for the industrial sector. In the VAT rate hike and government spending increase scenario, the negative effects of the VAT hike are exacerbated for sectors such as agriculture and trade due to higher costs of production factors as a result of additional government demand. Favorable conditions are being created for the raw materials and the construction sectors as well as the electricity, heat, water and gas distribution sector that have already developed dynamically. Beyond these sectors, the multiplier effects of government spending do not actually extend. The industrial sector is failing to realize its potential. Balanced and sustainable economic growth thus requires additional efforts on the part of industrial policy.

In this article, we use the theoretical division between market and network corruption and offer their empirical dimension. At its extreme, market corruption involves a free market for corrupt services, where anyone who pays a bribe gets access to an informal service. Network corruption provides access to corrupt services to a limited pool of individuals who are members of the circle of acquaintances of officials. Using cross-country data from the World Bank and the World Economic Forum, we answer the question of which form of corruption does more harm to the economy: (a) market corruption associated with an additional financial burden on business and uncertainty, but not violating the principles of competition, or (b) network corruption, which does not burden businesses with additional payments, but limits competition. As a result of econometric analysis, we come to the conclusion that network corruption “clogs the wheels of the economy” to a greater extent than market one.

A significant proportion of entrepreneurs as well as Russian population in general consider the possibility of criminal prosecution to be one of the main problems that hinders business development in Russia. However, only a small proportion of entrepreneurs are subjected to this type of prosecution. The current study attempts to empirically test the hypothesis about the negative impact of unjustified criminal prosecution on entrepreneurial activity. First, we examine the mechanism of unjustified criminal prosecution of entrepreneurs and then using mixed effects regression modelling on panel data for 2017—2021 assess its impact on the growth rate of the number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The number of appeals reviewed by the Center for Public Procedures “Business against corruption” (CPP “BAC”) is used as an indicator of unjustified criminal prosecution. The results show that each additionally handled appeal reduces the rate of growth in the number of SMEs in the medium term. This relationship is explained via the theory of signals: appeals to the CPP “BAC” serve as indicators of unjustified prosecution problem for entrepreneurs. If this problem persists, a decrease in the growth rates of firms, and an increase in their number in the shadow economy can also be expected.

This paper analyzes conflict resolution strategies in public procurement in Russia and Kazakhstan based on the suppliers survey. The results have shown that suppliers in Kazakhstan are generally less likely to report a conflict with procurers, both before and after the conclusion of a contract. In turn, the econometric analysis has confirmed the hypothesis that Russian suppliers potentially affiliated with procurers are less likely to encounter conflict situations in public procurement. As an indirect indicator of the affiliation of suppliers with procurers, the question of the attitude of suppliers to the practice of deliberate choice, when the procurer uses the procurement procedure to award a contract to a pre-selected supplier, was used. In addition, the empirical analysis has shown that in both countries, suppliers who were not inclined to trust the court and noted high costs of participation in litigation were more likely to use the strategy of direct negotiations with the procurer to resolve conflicts in public procurement.

The article is devoted to the 150^th anniversary of Marginal Revolution and deals with “patristic legacies” leading to the works of William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger and Léon Walras. The British empiricist-utilitarian tradition which inspired Jevons, the German subjectivist tradition culminating in the work of Menger, and the French Cartesian tradition, the traits of which can be easily seen in Walras, happened to give birth to similar theories of value and price based on marginal utility. All three also contributed to the creation of exact economic science. But the forms their theories took, as well as the policies they recommended, were very different and this difference could be explained by the different, nationally specific sources of their thought.

In this study, we investigate the determinants of rental prices in Russian Empire prior to World War I and the variation of housing rents across cities. For our research, we use statistical data on 1232 cities in 1910. Our analysis shows that the urban rents in imperial Russia were affected by such city characteristics as its population structure, prices for different goods, and the geographical position. In addition, the impact of these characteristics depends on the levels of rents and of the explanatory variables.

The paper examines clearing operations of settlement departments operating at the State Bank of the Russian Empire. The problem of clearing as a form of non­cash interbank settlement became extremely acute for the participants of the money market in the late 19th — early 20th century. The industrial achievements of Russia caused a significant increase in cash flows, which complicated the cash operations of not only of banking institutions, but also of economic entities of the country. This state of affairs demanded the speedy introduction of cashless payments in the banking sector of the Empire. It is noteworthy that at the end of the XIX century this problem began to be widely discussed in the Russian press and scientific circles. V. T. Sudeikin was one of the active supporters of the establishment of clearing houses in Russia. The Russian Ministry of Finance was sympathetic to the needs of the banking community, instructing the Governor of the State Bank, E. D. Pleske, to organize the preparation of a draft of Russian clearing houses. As a result of work on the aforementioned project, it was decided in 1898 to establish the first settlement institution at the St. Petersburg office of the State Bank. In subsequent years, such institutions were opened in numerous cities of the Empire. In 1914, there were settlement chambers in 45 Russian cities. The sum of their settlement operations exceeded 40 billion rubles, 80% of which were in St. Petersburg and Moscow.