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Institutional response after technological changes in telecommunications
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2023-5-50-67
Abstract
Imbalances in law enforcement require some alternatives for an institutional response to challenges. Telecommunications is an example industry where technological changes in the environment condition the need to adjust approaches for implementing antitrust tools for competition protection. The article deals with the discussion regarding the choice of structural alternatives for the framework of telecommunications (the institutional framework of this industry). The paper reveals the characteristics of competing alternatives: deregulation (regulation “pending”), economic regulation, reconfiguration of antitrust taking into account the limitations on the side of the regulator. It is shown that the solutions proposed on the basis of the Austrian school of economics and Pigouvian ideas are easily accessible in the framework of public discussions. This is why the economic regulation or deregulation are the most promising directions in the field of public policy. The Coasian approach requires better knowledge of the subject and allows to take into account the limitations on the side of the regulator, however, it is not likely to be accepted. At the same time, this approach provides a wider range of tools as a condition for the adaptive effectiveness of regulation.
About the Authors
A. E. Shastitko
Lomonosov Moscow State University;
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Andrey E. Shastitko
Moscow
К. A. Ionkina
Lomonosov Moscow State University;
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Karina A. Ionkina
Moscow
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For citations:
Shastitko A.E., Ionkina К.A. Institutional response after technological changes in telecommunications. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2023;(5):50-67. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2023-5-50-67
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