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Экономическая теория фирмы:систематизация
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2012-9-41-66
Аннотация
В статье рассматривается проблема создания общей теории фирмы. Обсуждается необходимость такой теории, дан обзор существующих подходов к обобщению теории фирмы и предложен вариант решения этой проблемы на базе теории контрактов. В основе общей теории лежит минимизация потерь от оппортунистического поведения, которое определяется материальной структурой. Далее предложено решение трех проблем «границ» (рабочего места, подразделения и фирмы) и пяти дилемм интеграции (вертикальной, горизонтальной, функциональной, связанной и конгломератной).
Ключевые слова
теория фирмы,
теория контрактов,
оппортунизм,
границы фирмы,
структура фирмы,
трансакционные издержки,
агентская проблема,
специфические активы,
права собственности
JEL: B41; B52; D02; D21; D23; L24; L25
Об авторе
М. А. Сторчевой
Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет
Россия
к. э. н., старший преподаватель кафедры стратегического и международного менеджмента Высшей школы менеджмента Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета
Россия
к. э. н., старший преподаватель кафедры стратегического и международного менеджмента Высшей школы менеджмента Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета
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Рецензия
Для цитирования:
Сторчевой М.А. Экономическая теория фирмы:систематизация. Вопросы экономики. 2012;(9):41-66. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2012-9-41-66
For citation:
Storchevoy M. The Economic Theory of the Firm: A Generalization. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2012;(9):41-66. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2012-9-41-66
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