References

voprecotest

Вопросы экономики

Voprosy Ekonomiki

0042-8736

Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP

10.32609/0042-8736-2012-9-41-66

voprecotest-747

Research Article

ВОПРОСЫ ТЕОРИИ

ISSUES OF THEORY

Экономическая теория фирмы:систематизация

The Economic Theory of the Firm: A Generalization

Сторчевой

М. А.

Storchevoy

к. э. н., старший преподаватель кафедры стратегического и международного менеджмента Высшей школы менеджмента Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета

storchevoy@gsom.pu.ru

Санкт-Петербургский государственный университетРоссияSt. Petersburg UniversityRussian Federation

2012

20092012

094166

2012

Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP

https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNotice

https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/view/747

В статье рассматривается проблема создания общей теории фирмы. Обсуждается необходимость такой теории, дан обзор существующих подходов к обобщению теории фирмы и предложен вариант решения этой проблемы на базе теории контрактов. В основе общей теории лежит минимизация потерь от оппортунистического поведения, которое определяется материальной структурой. Далее предложено решение трех проблем «границ» (рабочего места, подразделения и фирмы) и пяти дилемм интеграции (вертикальной, горизонтальной, функциональной, связанной и конгломератной).

The paper deals with development of a general theory of the firm. It discusses the demand for such a theory, reviews existing approaches to its generalization, and offers a new variant of general theory of the firm based on the contract theory. The theory is based on minimization of opportunistic behaviour determined by the material structure of production (a classification of ten structural factors is offered). This framework is applied to the analysis of three boundaries problems (boundaries of the job, boundaries of the unit, boundaries of the firm) and five integration dilemmas (vertical, horizontal, functional, related, and conglomerate).

теория фирмытеория контрактовоппортунизмграницы фирмыструктура фирмытрансакционные издержкиагентская проблемаспецифические активыправа собственности

theory of the firmcontract theoryopportunismboundaries of the firmstructure of the firmtransaction costsagency theoryspecific assetproperty rights

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.