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Экономические стимулы и общественно ориентированные предпочтения: субституты или комплементы? Часть 1
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2013-4-24-48
Аннотация
Прямые экономические стимулы создаются с целью увеличить вклад людей в общественные блага и стимулировать другие формы просоциального поведения. Но иногда они оказываются контрпродуктивными или менее эффективными в окружении индивидов, заботящихся только о собственной выгоде. Это может происходить потому, что стимулы отрицательно влияют на альтруизм, этические нормы, внутренние мотивы служить обществу, а также на другие общественно ориентированные предпочтения индивидов. Установлено, что существует и положительное воздействие стимулов, впрочем, менее распространенное, чем их негативные эффекты.
Об авторах
С. Боулз
Институт Санта Фе (Нью-Мехико, США), Университет Сиены (Сиена, Италия)
Соединённые Штаты Америки
Соединённые Штаты Америки
С. Поланья-Рейес
Университет Сиены, Университетский колледж Лондона (Лондон, Великобритания)
Великобритания
Великобритания
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Рецензия
Для цитирования:
Боулз С., Поланья-Рейес С. Экономические стимулы и общественно ориентированные предпочтения: субституты или комплементы? Часть 1. Вопросы экономики. 2013;(4):24-48. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2013-4-24-48
For citation:
Bowles S., Polanía-Reyes S. Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements? (Part 1). Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2013;(4):24-48. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2013-4-24-48
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