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Corporate Social Responsibility vs. Government Regulation: An Analysis of Institutional Choice
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2009-10-4-22
Abstract
The paper presents an economic theory of corporate social responsibility (CSR) based on the Coase theorem and analyzes economic, social, political and institutional factors that could affect comparative advantages of CSR over government regulation. Discussion of the Russian CSR model stresses the importance of protection of property rights and social capital for efficient implementation of the CSR idea and cautions against excessive involvement of government in CSR processes.
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Review
For citations:
Polishchuk L. Corporate Social Responsibility vs. Government Regulation: An Analysis of Institutional Choice. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2009;(10):4-22. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2009-10-4-22
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