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In the Shadow of Violence: Lessons for Limited Access Societies
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2012-3-4-31
Abstract
The paper presents a summary of the forthcoming book by the authors and discusses the sample study of the 9 developing countries. While admitting the non-linearity of economic development they claim that the developing countries make a transition from the limited access orders (where the coalition of powerful elite groups plays a major role, that is based on personal connections and hampers free political and economic competition) to the open access orders with democratic government and efficient decentralized economic system. The major conclusion of this article is that what the limited access societies should do is not simply introducing open access institutions, but reorganizing the incentives of the elites so that to limit violence, provide economic and political stability and make a gradual transition to the open access order beneficial for the elites.
About the Authors
D. North
Washington University in St. Louis
United States
United States
J. Wallis
University of Maryland
United States
United States
S. Webb
World Bank
United States
United States
B. Weingast
Stanford University
United States
United States
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Review
For citations:
North D., Wallis J., Webb S., Weingast B. In the Shadow of Violence: Lessons for Limited Access Societies. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2012;(3):4-31. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2012-3-4-31
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