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International Antitrust: Demand, Restrictionsand Lessons for Customs Union
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2012-9-110-125
Abstract
Enforcement of antitrust rules on the international level, on the one hand, is necessary to deter restriction of competition by the largest market participants, on the other - it suffers from the contradictions between incentives of national players. That is why international competition policy is based on institutional alternatives which look very imperfect. Harmonization of competition rules seems to be a good alternative only at first glance, since transplantation of antitrust provisions in different legal systems with different standards of proofs and different enforcement practices de facto leads to modification of the rule. Effective competition policy at the level of Customs Union requires to take into account all these limitations and risks.
About the Authors
S. Avdasheva
National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
A. Shastitko
Lomonosov Moscow State University; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Avdasheva S., Shastitko A. International Antitrust: Demand, Restrictionsand Lessons for Customs Union. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2012;(9):110-125. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2012-9-110-125
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