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State and Businessin the Arbitrazh (Commercial) Litigation
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-6-40-62
Abstract
This article seeks to answer the question whether Russian Arbitrazh (Commercial) courts tend to decide cases in favor of defendant versus plaintiff or state versus business. We have found that courts favor business entities in civil cases, while in administrative cases courts take decisions in favor of governmental bodies other things being equal. In addition, the plaintiff bias persists regardless of the type of the process. However, the plaintiff bias decreases with the rise of the case complexity. The article is based on the regression analysis of a random sample of 10 000 cases decided by the Russian Arbitrazh (commercial) courts in 2007-2011.
Keywords
economic institutions in Russia,
arbitrazh (commercial) courts,
business-government litigation,
empirical legal studies
JEL: K20, K23, K40, K41
About the Authors
K. Titaev
Institute for the Rule of Law, European University at St. Petersburg (Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
A. Dzmitryieva
Institute for the Rule of Law, European University at St. Petersburg (Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
I. Chetverikova
Institute for the Rule of Law, European University at St. Petersburg (Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Titaev K., Dzmitryieva A., Chetverikova I. State and Businessin the Arbitrazh (Commercial) Litigation. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2014;(6):40-62. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-6-40-62
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