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Investment climate and government turnover in russian regions

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We study the impact of Russian regional governors’ rotation and their affiliation with private sector firms for the quality of investment climate in Russian regions. A theoretical model presented in the paper predicts that these factors taken together improve “endogenous” property rights under authoritarian regimes. This conclusion is confirmed empirically by using Russian regional data for 2002—2010; early in that period gubernatorial elections had been canceled and replaced by federal government’s appointments. This is an indication that under certain conditions government rotation is beneficial for economic development even when democracy is suppressed.

About the Authors

G. Syunyaev
Laboratory for Applied Analysis of Institutions and Social Capital, National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation

L. Polishchuk
Laboratory for Applied Analysis of Institutions and Social Capital, National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation


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For citations:

Syunyaev G., Polishchuk L. Investment climate and government turnover in russian regions. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2014;(2):88-117. (In Russ.)

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