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Measuring Institutions in russian regions: Methodology, Sources of data, Analysis
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2015-2-69-103
Abstract
The paper explores various measures of institutional quality in Russian regions, and compares those measures to each other. Such analysis leads to the conclusion that Russian regional institutions are essentially multidimensional, and therefore comparisons of Russian regions in terms of their overall institutional quality could be problematic. New institutional indexes are derived from Russian enterprise surveys held under the BEEPS project of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. Such indexes yield a typology of Russian regions in terms of efficacy of regional administrations’ control over economy and bureaucracy in their regions. Dynamics of regional institutional indexes is investigated against the backdrop of Russia-wide institutional trends.
Keywords
institutions,
institutional measurement,
regional rankings,
centralized and decentralized corruption,
institutional dynamics
JEL: D73, D78, H73, H83, O17
About the Authors
A. Baranov
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
E. Malkov
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
L. Polishchuk
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
M. Rochlitz
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
G. Syunyaev
National Research University Higher School of Economics
United States
United States
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Review
For citations:
Baranov A., Malkov E., Polishchuk L., Rochlitz M., Syunyaev G. Measuring Institutions in russian regions: Methodology, Sources of data, Analysis. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2015;(2):69-103. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2015-2-69-103
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