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Digital platform governance structures: A case study of Yandex Taxi
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2024-9-76-106
Abstract
The study of governance structures in digital platform ecosystems remains relevant not only for economic research, but also for qualifying the legal status of platform workers, as well as for the development of economic policies that affect the labor market, rights and obligations of platforms and their workers. The paper presents the results of an empirical study of the conditions and mechanisms used by the Russian digital platform Yandex Taxi to incentivize and control platform workers (drivers) in 2022—2024. Mechanisms of transaction governance between platform participants are described, the dual role of algorithms is demonstrated: as systems of matching and coordination of participants, as well as incentives for legally independent drivers. The paper shows that digital platforms use hierarchical governance structure, controlling the parameters of transactions, quality standards and conditions of service provision. It is concluded that the platform system of rules and mechanisms is internally logical, which allows the platform to be regarded as a regulator of economic relations.
About the Author
I. Z. Geliskhanov
HSE University ; Lomonosov Moscow State University; State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Geliskhanov I.Z. Digital platform governance structures: A case study of Yandex Taxi. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2024;(9):76-106. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2024-9-76-106
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