Мир в лабиринте санкций: неоднозначность эмпирических свидетельств

В статье рассматриваются различные эффекты санкционных ограничений для стран-мишеней. Проанализированы результаты более 50 академических исследований последних десяти лет по вопросам влияния санкций на разные страны на основе изучения санкционных эпизодов преимущественно с 1980-х по 2015 г. Отмечено расширение применения санкций в последние годы, что связано с ужесточением межстрановой конкуренции и усилением конфликтности мирового развития. Показано, что санкционные эффекты отличаются неоднозначностью, изменчивостью во времени и разнонаправленностью. Выделены как негативные, так и отдельные позитивные санкционные эффекты, стимулирующие изменения в рамках международной торговли и прямых иностранных инвестиций. Показано, что санкции иногда выступают триггером структурных изменений в подсанкционных экономиках, сказываясь на характере их интеграции в глобальное производство. В условиях все большей включенности стран в санкционное противостояние существенно усложняется задача проведения экономической политики, ориентированной на структурные изменения и долгосрочную перспективу, прежде всего промышленной. Многим странам приходится выстраивать промышленную политику с учетом переформатирования глобальных цепочек создания стоимости и необходимости пересмотра своего участия в них. Это важно не только для стран, ставших мишенью для санкций, но и для их инициаторов, для которых обратные санкционные эффекты еще менее предсказуемы.

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