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Normative Rational Choice Theory: Past, Present, and Future
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2012-10-52-75
Abstract
The paper shows that the theory of rational choice should be better understood as a normative, prescriptive, and not as a descriptive theory of human behavior. Such an interpretation amounts to claiming that there is a «normative turn» in economics. This turn means that the majority of economists no longer regards rational choice theory as an adequate description of economic activity. The author also tries to free the normative issues from ethical meanings that are commonly attributed to it in economic theory. Perspectives of the normative turn in the context of a recent development of behavioral and experimental economics are also discussed.
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For citations:
Hands W. Normative Rational Choice Theory: Past, Present, and Future. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2012;(10):52-75. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2012-10-52-75
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