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Нормативная теория рационального выбора: прошлое, настоящее и будущее

https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2012-10-52-75

Полный текст:

Аннотация

В статье показано, что теорию рационального выбора нужно понимать как нормативную, предписывающую, а не дескриптивную теорию экономического поведения. Такая интерпретация позволяет констатировать «нормативный поворот» в кономической науке, когда рациональный выбор не воспринимается более в качестве адекватного описания экономической деятельности большинством ученых. Кроме того, автор стремится отделить «нормативное» начало от этического смысла, который обычно придается ему в экономической науке, и показать, каковы перспективы нормативного поворота в свете современного развития поведенческой и экспериментальной экономики.

Об авторе

У. Хэндс
Университет Пьюжет-Саунда, Такома (штат Вашингтон, США)
Россия
профессор факультета экономики, Университет Пьюжет-Саунда, Такома (штат Вашингтон, США)


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Для цитирования:


Хэндс У. Нормативная теория рационального выбора: прошлое, настоящее и будущее. Вопросы экономики. 2012;(10):52-75. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2012-10-52-75

For citation:


Hands W. Normative Rational Choice Theory: Past, Present, and Future. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2012;(10):52-75. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2012-10-52-75

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ISSN 0042-8736 (Print)