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Microfoundations of dominance of fundamentalism in economic policy: Is there an antidote?

https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2024-1-94-114

Abstract

The article examines the possible reasons for the dominance of fundamentalism( in the form of Pigouvianism or market fundamentalism) over functionalism (Coasianism) in the practice of decision-making in economic policy. Continuing the study of the relationship between Coasianism, Pigouvianism and market fundamentalism, presented in previous works, the article focuses on finding the basis for the dominance of fundamentalism at the level of individual decisions and actions — in particular, in the field of cognitive bias and behavioral effects. Decision-making using an automatic cognitive system, subject to cognitive bias, as opposed to a reflective system, can lead to the choice of a fundamentalist solution to a problem where it is not the most efficient, and also reduces the efficiency of functionalism, since it prevents the correct identification of the problem itself, of the structural alternatives for its solution, as well as identifying and comparing the effects associatedwith each of the alternatives. The microfoundations of insufficient supply and demand of the Coasian approach are explored. Based on the identified problems of supply and demand for Coasianism, as one of the possible ways to promote it, it is proposed to consider the primary socialization of the individual in the learning process, the formation of substantive critical thinking. It is emphasized that adjustments to the socialization process are a matter of long-term strategy

About the Authors

N. S. Pavlova
Lomonosov Moscow State University; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Russian Federation

Moscow



A. E. Shastitko
Lomonosov Moscow State University; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration

Moscow



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For citations:


Pavlova N.S., Shastitko A.E. Microfoundations of dominance of fundamentalism in economic policy: Is there an antidote? Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2024;(1):94-114. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2024-1-94-114

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