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Antitrust’s effects: Lessons for evidence-based policy
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2023-5-68-90
Abstract
There is no unanimous opinion on the benefits of antitrust actions. They can result in direct and indirect costs for companies. The article evaluates the effect of the enforcement activities of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia on the market value of companies in the oil industry (reputational costs). An empirical conclusion was obtained on the basis of a sample of events of Russian oil companies from 2012 to 2018 that the actions of the antimonopoly service significantly affect the company’s value not only when the fact of violation is established and decisions are made and orders are issued, but also when only its signs are established and warnings are issued and cases are initiated.
Supporting agencies: This research is supported by Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)
About the Authors
A. Y. Stavniychuk
https://www.econ.msu.ru/departments/cip/staff/stavniychuk/
Lomonosov Moscow State University; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration Institute of Applied Economic Research
Russian Federation
Lomonosov Moscow State University; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration Institute of Applied Economic Research
Russian Federation
Anna Y. Stavniychuk
Lomonosov Moscow State University?Faculty of Economics
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration Institute of Applied Economic Research
Moscow
N. S. Pavlova
Lomonosov Moscow State University;
The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Natalia S. Pavlova
Lomonosov Moscow State University, Faculty of Economics;
The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Institute of Applied Economic Research
Moscow
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Stavniychuk A.Y., Pavlova N.S. Antitrust’s effects: Lessons for evidence-based policy. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2023;(5):68-90. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2023-5-68-90
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