|Generate QR code
Open Access
Subscription Access
Possibilities and limits of reform (On the book by Thrainn Eggertsson “Imperfect institutions. Possibilities and limits of reform”)
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2022-2-147-157
Abstract
The paper explains why, despite the publication of the original edition of the book in 2005, Eggertsson’s work is still relevant and why it should be studied not only by experts in institutional economics. The provisions of the research results on imperfect institutions are discussed, including the discussions of the institutional transformation of the Russian economy at the end of the 20th century. The issues of the relationship between social and production technologies, path dependency, social mental models and institutional changes are revealed, with an emphasis on the problems of the consequences of mass privatization in Russia, and on the transplantation of institutions following the ideas on the institutional structure of society.
About the Author
A. E. Shastitko
Lomonosov Moscow State University;
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Andrey E. Shastitko
Moscow
References
1. Acemoglu D., Robinson J. (2016). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. Moscow: AST. (In Russian).
2. Marx K. (1983). Capital. Criticism of political economy, Vol. 1. Moscow: Politizdat. (In Russian).
3. North D. (1993). Institutions, ideology, and economic performance. In: L. Piyasheva, J. Dorn (eds.). From plan to market: The future of the post-communist republics. Moscow: Catallaxy. (In Russian).
4. North D. (1997). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Moscow: Nachala. (In Russian).
5. North D. C., Wallis J. J., Weingast B. R. (2011). Violence and social orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. Moscow: Gaidar Institute Publ. (In Russian).
6. Polterovich V. M. (2001). Transplantation of economic institutions. Economics of Contemporary Russia, No. 3, pp. 24—50. (In Russian).
7. Polterovich V. M. (2012). Reform design: How to search for interim institutions. Montenegrin Journal of Economics, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 25—44. (In Russian).
8. Shastitko A. E. (2010). The new institutional economics. Moscow. Teis. (In Russian).
9. Shastitko A. E. (2019). Meso-institutions: Proliferating essences or evolving economic research programme? Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 5, pp. 5—25. (In Russian). https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2019-5-5-25
10. Eggertsson T. (2001). Economic behavior and institutions. Moscow: Delo. (In Russian).
11. Eggertsson T. (2011). Knowledge and the theory of institutional change. Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 7, pp. 4—16. (In Russian).] https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2011-7-4-16
12. Eggertsson T. (2022). Imperfect institutions: Possibilities and limits of reform. Moscow; St. Petersburg: Gaidar Institute Publ.; Faculty of Liberal Arts and Sciences, St Petersburg State University. (In Russian).
13. Acemoglu D., Robinson J. A. (2019). The narrow corridor: States, societies, and the fate of liberty. New York: Penguin Press.
14. Arthur W. B. (1989). Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical events. Economic Journal, Vol. 99, No. 394, pp. 116—131. https://doi.org/10.2307/2234208
15. Blanchard O., Kremer M. (1997). Disorganization. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 4, pp. 1091—1126. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300555439
16. David P. A. (1985). Clio and the economics of QWERTY. American Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 2, pp. 332—337.
17. Denzau A., North D. (1994). Shared mental models: Ideologies and institutions. Kyklos, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 3—31. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1994.tb02246.x
18. Joskow P. L. (2002). Transaction cost economics, antitrust rules and remedies. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 95—116. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/18.1.95
19. Ménard С. (2017). Meso-institutions: The variety of regulatory arrangements in the water sector. Utilities Policy, Vol. 49, pp. 6—19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2017.05.001
20. Ménard C., Jimenez A., Tropp H. (2018). Addressing the policy-implementation gaps in water services: The key role of meso-institutions. Water International, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 13—33. https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2017.1405696
21. Ménard C., Shabalov I., Shastitko A. (2021). Institutions to the rescue: Untangling industrial fragmentation, institutional misalignment, and political constraints in the Russian gas pipeline industry. Energy Research & Social Science, Vol. 80, article 102223. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102223
22. North D. C. (1981). Structure and change in economic history. New York; London: Norton.
23. Shastitko A., Ménard C. (2017). Discrete institutional alternatives: Theoretical and policy issues (Celebrating the 80th anniversary of Ronald Coase’s “Nature of the firm”). Russian Journal of Economics, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 200—220. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ruje.2017.06.005
24. Shastitko A., Ménard C., Pavlova N. (2018). The curse of antitrust facing bilateral monopoly: Is regulation hopeless? Russian Journal of Economics, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 175—196. https://doi.org/10.3897/j.ruje.4.27031
25. Zerbe R., Bauman Y., Finkle A. (2006). An aggregate measure for benefit-cost analysis. Ecological Economics, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 449—461. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2005.07.015
Supplementary files
Review
For citations:
Shastitko A.E. Possibilities and limits of reform (On the book by Thrainn Eggertsson “Imperfect institutions. Possibilities and limits of reform”). Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2022;(2):147-157. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2022-2-147-157
Views:
927
Email this article 
