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The procurement form matters
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2022-10-113-137
Abstract
The paper is devoted to the consequences of the choice among alternative procurement procedures in terms of cost and quality results of the complex projects implementation in the existing institutional environment of the Russian Federation. The empirical analysis, that was conducted on the procurement data in the field of metro construction within Federal law No. 223, showed that the auction’s form despite the higher indicators of the level of competition at the bidding loses its efficiency by price criterion with increasing contract complexity and demonstrates consistently lower relative savings rate compared to request for proposals in the case of procurement of design, construction, and repair works. Moreover, the auction is characterized by higher indicators of contract completion delays, which have a critical role in the implementation of infrastructure projects. The approaches proposed in the paper and obtained results may be useful in the formation of planning methods for a wide class of projects in terms of procurement activity organization.
About the Author
L. S. Plekhanova
Lomonosov Moscow State University;
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Lidia S. Plekhanova
Moscow
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For citations:
Plekhanova L.S. The procurement form matters. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2022;(10):113-137. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2022-10-113-137
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