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Economic analysis of the firm’s boundaries and the limits of competition: The case of Nord Stream 2 AG
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2021-10-134-151
Abstract
Using publicly available information, the article examines the economic concepts, which underlie the arguments of the decision of Polish competition authority UOKiK in relation to the participants of the Nord Stream 2. It explains the interrelation between economic and legal concepts, which are to be applied to interpret the competitive impact of joint venture and probable theory of harm for infrastructure investments under competition law of European Union, including in comparison with Russian competition law. It has been demonstrated that the resolution of a consortium case should be based on the proof of two statements. The first statement implies that the joint venture is a firm (and therefore the creation of a joint venture is a deal leading to economic concentration). The second statement means that despite Gazprom adopted the commitments about decision of the European Commission and trends in the development of the European gas market, the possibility of price discrimination is retained. Discussion and contestation of the decision against PJSC Gazprom testify in favor of maintaining the relevance of institutional studies and studies of industry markets for resolving legal disputes arising from the application of competition law.
About the Authors
S. B. Avdasheva
HSE University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Svetlana B. Avdasheva
Moscow
G. F. Yusupova
HSE University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Gyuzel F. Yusupova
Moscow
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Avdasheva S.B., Yusupova G.F. Economic analysis of the firm’s boundaries and the limits of competition: The case of Nord Stream 2 AG. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2021;(10):134-151. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2021-10-134-151
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