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On the limits of unsolvability of the “free rider problem”
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2016-11-57-75
Abstract
The article reinterprets the classic «free rider problem» known as unsolvable from the position of how the free rider’s surrounding affects him. It introduces the concepts of public and private harm from the free rider’s activity. It also describes a wide variety of manifestations of the “free ridership” in which the private harm suffered by significant social groups is large enough to cause on their part an active opposition to free riders. According to the authors, under proper institutional conditions this opposition results in effective decision of the “free rider problem”. They offer a mathematical model of the process: the Markov chain with a single or multiple absorbing states.
About the Authors
A. Yudanov
Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
O. Pyrkina
Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
E. Bekker
Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Yudanov A., Pyrkina O., Bekker E. On the limits of unsolvability of the “free rider problem”. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2016;(11):57-75. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2016-11-57-75
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