|Generate QR code
Open Access
Subscription Access
Public Choice Theory. A Textbook. Chapter 7. Public Choice under Representative Democracy: Government and Coalitions in Parliament
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2003-2-111-132
Abstract
The specifics of pubic choice under representative democracy are considered in the seventh chapter of the textbook. The factors of forming of coalitions in parliament are analyzed. The methods of voting manipulation including the formulation of Arrow's impossibility theorem are described. The concept of logrolling is distinguished. The chapter also includes further readings, control tests and questions.
References
1. Голосов Г. Партийные системы России и стран Восточной Европы. М.: Весь Мир, 1999.
2. Сморгунов Л. Современная сравнительная политология. М.: РОССПЭН, 2002.
3. Шмачкова Т. Теории коалиций и становление российской многопартийности (методики рационализации политического процесса) // Полис, 1996, № 5, c. 28-52.
4. Arrow K. Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: John Wiley and sons, 1963 [1951].
5. Arrow K. Social Science and Individual Values. New-York, 1951 (revised edn. 1963)
6. Axeldod R. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York, Basic books, 1984.
7. Axelrod R. Conflicts of Interest. Chicago: Markham, 1970.
8. Breton A., Galeotti G. Is Proportional Representation Always the Best Electoral Rule? // Public Finance, 1985, vol. 40, p. 1-16.
9. Buchanan J. and Tullock G. The Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1865.
10. Cooter R. The Strategic Constitution. Princeton. Princeton University Press, 2000.
11. De Swaan A. Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation: A Study of Formal Theories of Coalition Formation, Applied to Nine European Parlaments after 1918. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1973.
12. Gibbard A. Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma (1969) и Brown D.J., Aggregation of preferences // Quaterly Journal of Economics, 1975. Vol. 89, p. 456-469.
13. Gibbard A. Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result // Econometrica, vol. 41, 1973, p. 586-601.
14. Hansen P. Another Graphical Proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem - Journal of Economic Education, 2002, vol. 33, No 3, p.217-235.
15. Hudson J. Preferences, Loyalty and Party Choice // Public Choice, 1995, vol. 82, No 3/4, p. 325-340.
16. Johnson D. Public Choice. An Introduction to the New Political Economy. Bristlecone Books, 1991.
17. Laver M., Schofield N. Multiparty Government. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991.
18. Leonard D., Natkiel R. World Atlas of Elections. Voting Patterns in 39 Democracies. London: The Economist Publications, 1986.
19. Lijphart A. Democracies. New Have, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984.
20. Lijphart A. The Political Consequences of Election Laws, 1945-85 // American Political Science Review, 1990, vol. 84, p. 481-496.
21. Longley N. Legislative Systems with Absolute Party Discipline: Implications for the Agency Theory Approach to the Constituent-Legislator Link // Public Choice, 1998, vol. 97, No 1/2, p. 121-141.
22. Lott J. Donald Wittman's The myth of democratic failure // Public Choice, 1997, vol. 91, No 3/4, p. 1-13.
23. Merlo A. Economic Dynamics and Government Stability in Postwar Italy // The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1998, vol. 80, No 4, p. 629-637.
24. Mueller D. Public Choice II. A revisited edition of Public Choice, Cambridge University Press, 1995 [1989], ch.12, c. 217-228.
25. Pennings P., Keman H., Kleinnijenhuis J. Doing Research in Political Science. An Introduction to Comparative Methods and Statistics. London, Thousand Oaks; New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1999.
26. Perspectives on Public Choice: А Handbook, Ed. by D. Mueller. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
27. Persson T., Tabellini G. Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy. MIT Press, 2000.
28. Plott C.R., Axiomatic social choice theory: an overview and interpretation // American Journal of Political Science. 1976. Vol. 20. P. 511-596.
29. Riker W. Liberalism Against Populism. W.H. Freeman, 1982.
30. Riker W., The entry of game theory into political science // Toward a history of game theory. Ed. by E. Weintraub. Durnham, London: Duke University Press, 1992.
31. Rowley C. Donald Wittman‘s The myth of democratic failure // Public Choice, 1997, vol. 91, No 3/4, p. 15-26.
32. Saari D. Decisions and Elections. Explaining the Unexpected. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
33. Satterthwaite M. A. Strategy-Proofness and Arrows`s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions // Journal of Economic Theory, 1975, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 187-217.
34. Sen A. Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Harvard University Press, 1997.
35. Sen A. Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Vickrey W. Utility, Strategy and Social Decision Rules // Quaterly Journal of Economics, November 1960, 74, pp. 507-535.
36. Sen A. Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco, Holden Day, 1970.
37. Sen A. Personal Utilities and Public Judgments: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics? // Economic Journal, 1979, vol. 89, p. 537-588.
38. Sen A. Social Choice Theory: A Re-examination // Econometrica, 1977, vol. 45, p. 53-89.
39. Taylor M., Laver M. Government Coalitions in Western Europe // European Journal of Political Research, 1973, vol. 1, p. 195-248.
40. The Study of Coalition Behavior: Theoretical Perspectives and Cases from four Countries. Ed. by Groeninngs S., Kelley E.W., Leiserson M. New York, Holt Reinhart and Winston, 1970.
41. Tullock G. On Voting: A Public Choice Approach. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2001.
42. Vickrey W. Utility, Strategy and Social Decision Rules // Quaterly Journal of Economics, 1960, vol. 74, p. 507-535.
Review
For citations:
Nureev R. Public Choice Theory. A Textbook. Chapter 7. Public Choice under Representative Democracy: Government and Coalitions in Parliament. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2003;(2):111-132. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2003-2-111-132
Views:
811
Email this article 
