|Generate QR code
Open Access
Subscription Access
Incentives for process innovations under discrete structural alternatives of competition policy
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2016-4-56-85
Abstract
This study analyzes the incentives for process innovations under different conditions determined by the competition policy for intellectual property rights (IPR) and particular features of markets and technologies. Competition policy is defined by the presence or absence of compulsory licensing, markets are characterized by technological leadership or technological competition. The results of modelling show that the uncertainty engendered by technological competition may lower the intensity of innovative activities, if there are no mechanisms of coordination between participants. Voluntary licensing generally improves social welfare but does not guarantee an increase in innovative efforts. Compulsory licensing can impede innovations due to the opportunistic behaviour of market participants but certain measures of state policy can prevent this negative effect.
About the Authors
A. Shastitko
Lomonosov Moscow State University; 2 Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
A. Kurdin
Lomonosov Moscow State University; National Research University Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
References
1. Gavrilov D. (2010). The suppression of unfair competition acts in the sphere of exclusive rights. Predprinimatelskoe Pravo, No. 4, pp. 13—18. (In Russian).
2. Knyazeva I., Voytsekhovich A. (2012). Features of competitive processes, management of innovations and modern trends in the policy of antimonopoly regulation. ECO, No. 12, pp. 78—84. (In Russian).
3. Rozanova N. (2002). Market structure and incentives for innovations. Problemy Prognozirovaniya, No. 3, pp. 93—108. (In Russian).
4. Shastitko A. A. (2015a). The results of the Russian antitrust law and related law enforcement in the area of intellectual property rights relations. Nauchnye Issledovaniya Ekonomicheskogo Fakulteta. Elektronnyi Zhurnal, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 79—94. (In Russian).
5. Shastitko A. E. (2013). Is it worth to protect competition from intellectual property rights? Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 8, pp. 60—82. (In Russian).
6. Shastitko A. E. (2015b). Process innovations under Cournot competition for N > 2. Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta. Seriya 6: Ekonomika, No. 3, pp. 3—25. (In Russian).
7. Shastitko A., Kurdin A. (2012). Antitrust policy and intellectual property rights protection in emerging markets. Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 1, pp. 84—95. (In Russian).
8. Shastitko A. E., Kurdin A. A. (2014). Protection of intellectual property rights and competition policy: Seeking for a better balance. Zhurnal Novoy Ekonomicheskoy Assotsiatsii, No. 1, pp. 111—135. (In Russian).
9. Shastitko A. E., Kurdin A. A. (2015). Opportunities and risks of antitrust reform in the area of intellectual property rights relations. Nauchnye Issledovaniya Ekonomicheskogo Fakulteta. Elektronnyi Zhurnal, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 5—31. (In Russian).
10. Acemoglu D., Akcigit U. (2012). Intellectual property rights policy, competition and innovation. Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 1-42.
11. Aghion P., Griffith R. (2005). Competition and growth: Reconciling theory and evidence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
12. Arce D. (1997). Correlated strategies as institutions. Theory and Decision, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 271-285.
13. Arrow K. (1962). Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. In: R. Nelson (ed.). The rate and direction of inventive activity: Economic and social factors. Princeton, NJ: National Bureau of Economic Research; Princeton University Press, pp. 609-626.
14. Fan C., Jun B., Wolfstetter E. (2013). Licensing process innovations when losers’ messages determine royalty rates. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 82, No. C, pp. 388-402.
15. Fiestras-Janeiro G., Borm P., van Megen F. (1998). Protective and prudent behaviour in games. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 167-175.
16. Gallini N. (1984). Deterrence by market sharing: A strategic incentive for licensing. American Economic Review, Vol. 74, No. 5, pp. 931-941.
17. Gallini N., Winter R. (1985). Licensing in the theory of innovation. RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 237-252.
18. Gilbert R. (2006). Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where are we in the competition-innovation debate? In: A. Jaffe et al. (eds.). Innovation policy and the economy, Vol. 6. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 159-215.
19. Gilbert R., Newbery D. (1982). Preemtive patenting and the persistence of monopoly. American Economic Review, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 514-526.
20. Gilbert R., Shapiro C. (1996). An economic analysis of unilateral refusals to license intellectual property. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, Vol. 93, No. 23, pp. 12749-12755.
21. Kamien M., Tauman Y. (1986). Fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 101, No. 3, pp. 471-491.
22. Kamien M., Tauman Y. (2002). Patent licensing: The inside story. The Manchester School, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 7-15.
23. Kamien M., Oren S., Tauman Y. (1992). Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation. Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 21, No. 5, pp. 483-508.
24. Katsoulacos Y. (2009). Optimal legal standards for refusals to license intellectual property: A welfare-based analysis. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 269-295.
25. Katz M., Shapiro C. (1986). How to license intangible property. Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 101, No. 3, pp. 567-589.
26. Motta M. (2004). Competition policy: theory and practice. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
27. Rasmusen E. (1992). Games and information. An introduction to game theory. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
28. Reinganum J. (1983). Uncertain innovation and the persistence of monopoly. American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 4, pp. 741-748.
29. Schumpeter J. (1942). Capitalism, socialism and democracy. N. Y.: Harper & Brothers.
30. Seifert J. (2013). Compulsory licensing, innovation and welfare. Conference Paper. Available at: http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/79778/1/VfS_2013_ pid_58.pdf.
31. Shapiro C. (2012). Competition and innovation: Did Arrow hit the bull’s eye? In: J. Lerner, S. Stern (eds.). The rate and direction of inventive activity revisited. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 361-404.
32. Tandon P. (1982). Optimal patents with compulsory licensing. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90, No. 3, pp. 470-486.
33. Tirole J. (1994). The theory of industrial organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
34. Yan Q., Xu S., Zhu L. (2012). Optimal licensing schemes for quality-improving innovation in the Bertrand market. In: Y. Wu (ed.). Software engineering and knowledge engineering: Theory and practice. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 467-473.
Review
For citations:
Shastitko A., Kurdin A. Incentives for process innovations under discrete structural alternatives of competition policy. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2016;(4):56-85. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2016-4-56-85
Views:
655
Email this article 
