

Options as an Instrument of Fuel-Energy Complex Regulation
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2005-12-133-144
Abstract
In order to solve political and economical problems of FEC deregulation and increase its efficiency the authors suggest the mechanism using options. It is based on the substitution of state regulation by the system of private legal obligations of the proprietors of existing assets to their consumers. It is proposed that the proprietors of newly created assets will be free from these obligations as well as from natural monopolies regulation.
About the Authors
V. KizilovRussian Federation
independent consultant
V. Novikov
Russian Federation
References
1. Бреннан Дж., Бьюкенен Дж. Причина правил. Конституционная политическая экономия. СПб.: Экономическая школа, 2005.
2. Edwards S., Lederman D. The Political Economy of Unilateral Trade Liberalization: The Case of Chile. NBER Working Paper No. 6510.
3. Kelman S. Changing Big Government Organizations: Easier than meets the eye? Kennedy School of Government, Working Paper № RWP04-026, July 2004. http://www.ashinstitute.harvard.edu/Ash/Kelman_OP-02-04.pdf.
4. Kelman S. Unleashing Change: A Study of Organizational Renewal in Government. Brookings Institution, 2005.
5. Rothbard M. Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics. In: On Freedom and Free Enterprise: The Economics of Free Enterprise. Sennholz M. (ed.). Princeton, NJ, D. Van Nostrand, 1956. http://www.mises.org/rothbard/toward.pdf.
Review
For citations:
Kizilov V., Novikov V. Options as an Instrument of Fuel-Energy Complex Regulation. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2005;(12):133-144. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2005-12-133-144