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From Market Studies to Society Analysis
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2005-12-63-81
Abstract
The article examines the main concepts of modern institutional theory and the ways its tools and concepts could be applied in the real policy-making. In particular, the authors focus on behavioral assumptions of the theory that allow them to explain the imperfection of economic agents’ behavior as a reason for rules and institutions to emerge. Problems of institutional design are also discussed.
About the Authors
Ya. Kouzminov
State University - Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
K. Bendoukidze
State University - Higher School of Economics
Georgia
Georgia
M. Yudkevich
State University - Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Kouzminov Ya., Bendoukidze K., Yudkevich M. From Market Studies to Society Analysis. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2005;(12):63-81. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2005-12-63-81
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