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Психология и экономика: результаты эмпирических исследований. Часть II. Общественно ориентированные предпочтения и нестандартные убеждения
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2011-5-56-74
Аннотация
Во второй части большой работы, посвященной современной поведенческой экономике, рассматриваются нестандартные предпочтения, связанные с альтруизмом и благотворительностью. Кроме того, автор изучает нестандартные убеждения, показывая, как самоуверенность, некорректная оценка вероятностей и экстраполяция прошлого опыта искажают рациональное принятие решений, в том числе и на финансовых рынках.
Ключевые слова
Об авторе
С. Делавинья
Калифорнийский университет в Беркли
Соединённые Штаты Америки
профессор экономики
Соединённые Штаты Америки
профессор экономики
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Рецензия
Для цитирования:
Делавинья С. Психология и экономика: результаты эмпирических исследований. Часть II. Общественно ориентированные предпочтения и нестандартные убеждения. Вопросы экономики. 2011;(5):56-74. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2011-5-56-74
For citation:
DellaVigna S. Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field. Part II: Social Preferences and Nonstandard Beliefs. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2011;(5):56-74. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2011-5-56-74
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