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To Allow for Cartels?
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2015-6-143-150
Abstract
Opportunities for cartels study within the context of comparative analysis of mechanisms of governance structural alternatives are shown. The correlation between cartels and horizontal agreements restricting competition is described. Characteristics of antitrust control regimes of horizontal agreements are identified. The Russian agenda for cartel deterrence is presented.
About the Author
A. Shastitko
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (Moscow, Russia); Lomonosov Moscow State University (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Shastitko A. To Allow for Cartels? Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2015;(6):143-150. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2015-6-143-150
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