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On the Methodology of Cartel agreements analysis
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-9-53-64
Abstract
This article is an attempt of summarizing key economic approaches to cartel agreements analysis, its stability, ways of estimating social consequences of cartel agreements. It is alleged that the traditional way of understanding the cartels’ role as completely negative is not accurate; this type of inter-corporate agreements may also bring positive effects on industrial markets. Typical limits of analytical apparatus, contradictions that appear while interpreting results of specific economic models are also represented in the article, as well as substantiation of a discrete role of pricing factor within the analysis of anti-competitive agreements.
Keywords
cartel,
anti-competitive agreements,
economic methods of analy- sis,
consequences estimation,
competition policy
JEL: B41, D43, L41, L44
About the Authors
E. Andreyashchenko
Lomonosov Moscow State University (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
A. Zazdravnykh
Lomonosov Moscow State University (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Andreyashchenko E., Zazdravnykh A. On the Methodology of Cartel agreements analysis. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2014;(9):53-64. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-9-53-64
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