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Incorporating limited rationality into economics
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-5-45-65
Abstract
Harstad and Selten (this forum) raise interesting questions about the relative promise of optimization models and bounded-rationality models in making progress in economics. This article builds from their analysis by indicating the potential for using neoclassical (broadly defined) optimization models to integrate insights from psychology on the limits to rationality into economics. I lay out an approach to making (imperfect and incremental) improvements over previous economic theory by incorporating greater realism while attempting to maintain the breadth of application, the precision of predictions, and the insights of neoclassical theory. I then discuss how many human limits to full rationality are, in fact, well understood in terms of optimization.
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Rabin M. Incorporating limited rationality into economics. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2014;(5):45-65. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-5-45-65
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