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Интеграция ограниченной рациональности в экономическую науку
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-5-45-65
Аннотация
В статье, построенной как комментарий к работе Харстада и Зельтена (см.: Вопросы экономики. 2014. № 5. С. 5-26. - Примеч. ред. ), акцент сделан на возможности использовать неоклассические (в широком смысле) оптимизационные модели для интеграции в экономическую теорию идей из психологии и анализа ограничений рациональности. Предлагается постепенно совершенствовать прежнюю экономическую науку путем повышения реалистичности при одновременной попытке сохранить обширность приложений, точность в формулировках прогнозов и идейные достижения неоклассической теории. Кроме того, обсуждается, какие ограничения полной рациональности в действительности можно лучше понять в терминах оптимизации.
Об авторе
М. Рабин
Университет Калифорнии в Беркли (США)
Россия
профессор Университета Калифорнии в Беркли (США)
Россия
профессор Университета Калифорнии в Беркли (США)
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Рецензия
Для цитирования:
Рабин М. Интеграция ограниченной рациональности в экономическую науку. Вопросы экономики. 2014;(5):45-65. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-5-45-65
For citation:
Rabin M. Incorporating limited rationality into economics. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2014;(5):45-65. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-5-45-65
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