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Bounded-rationality models:tasks to become intellectually competitive
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-5-4-26
Abstract
Research in experimental economics has cogently challenged the fundamental precept of neoclassical economics that economic agents optimize. The last two decades have seen elaboration of boundedly rational models that try to move away from the optimization approach, in ways consistent with experimental findings. Nonetheless, the collection of alternative models has made little headway supplanting the dominant paradigm. We delineate key ways in which neoclassical microeconomics holds continuing and compelling advantages over bounded-rationality models, and suggest, via a few examples, the sorts of further, difficult pushes that would be needed to redress this state of affairs. Closer collaboration between theoretic modeling and experiments is clearly seen to be necessary.
About the Authors
R. M. Harstad
University of Missouri (Columbia, MO, United States)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
R. Selten
Academy Research Center “Rationality in the Light of Experimental Economic Results”, University of Bonn (Bonn, Germany)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Harstad R.M., Selten R. Bounded-rationality models:tasks to become intellectually competitive. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2014;(5):4-26. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-5-4-26
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