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Экономические модели мониторинга качества окружающей среды в условиях неполной информации и высоких издержек

https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-4-99-122

Полный текст:

Аннотация

В статье рассматривается мониторинг изменения качества окружающей среды как центральный элемент экологического регулирования. Мониторинг, как любой вид принципалагентских отношений, может провоцировать коррупционное поведение. Авторы анализируют необходимые для разработки эффективной системы природоохранных мероприятий экономические модели мониторинга окружающей среды с учетом неполной информации и высоких издержек.

Об авторах

М. И. Левин
РАНХиГС (Москва)
Россия
д. э. н., проф., завкафедрой микроэкономического анализа НИУ ВШЭ, завкафедрой микроэкономики РАНХиГС (Москва)


К. А. Матросова
НИУ ВШЭ; РАНХиГС (Москва)
Россия
преподаватель департамента теоретической экономики, аспирант НИУ ВШЭ; старший преподаватель факультета экономики РАНХиГС (Москва)


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Для цитирования:


Левин М.И., Матросова К.А. Экономические модели мониторинга качества окружающей среды в условиях неполной информации и высоких издержек. Вопросы экономики. 2014;(4):99-122. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-4-99-122

For citation:


Levin M., Matrosova K. Economic models of Environment monitoring under imperfect information and high Costs. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2014;(4):99-122. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-4-99-122

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ISSN 0042-8736 (Print)