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Effects of Hostile Tradition in Antitrust: Active Repentance versus Cooperation Agreements?
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-3-62-85
Abstract
The article focuses on the effects of leniency programs when the antitrust authority is capable of making errors in classifying agreements between competitors. The research confirms that the application of the program can impede the growth of social welfare by destroying and preventing horizontal cooperation agreements. The obtained results can help explain the peculiar properties of the cases that have been investigated with the use of the leniency program in Russia.
Keywords
antitrust policy,
cartel,
leniency program,
cooperation agreement,
enforcement errors,
hostile tradition in antitrust
JEL: D43, K21, L41
About the Authors
N. Pavlova
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (Moscow, Russia); Lomonosov Moscow State University (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
A. Shastitko
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (Moscow, Russia); Lomonosov Moscow State University (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Pavlova N., Shastitko A. Effects of Hostile Tradition in Antitrust: Active Repentance versus Cooperation Agreements? Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2014;(3):62-85. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-3-62-85
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