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Rent-Seeking Russia
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-1-60-77
Abstract
The Russian economy is in transition period “from plan to market”, which is characterized by immature institutions and expansion of rent-seeking behavior. In this article, the authors consider rent as a possible excess return above the minimum income needed to encourage an agent to implement the actions specified by the principal. In this paper the authors present and analyze the following types of rent: natural, exclusive, political, administrative and transitional. They also consider the consequences of the rent-seeking behavior for Russian economy.
About the Authors
M. Levin
National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
G. Satarov
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration; INDEM Foundation (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Levin M., Satarov G. Rent-Seeking Russia. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2014;(1):60-77. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2014-1-60-77
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