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Политика или экономика? Ловушки стандартных решений
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2013-12-4-28
Аннотация
В экономической науке в рамках стандартного подхода к анализу экономической политики и к выработке соответствующих рекомендаций явно или неявно пренебрегают политической сферой и политико-экономическим анализом, утверждая, что любой провал рынка следует устранять как можно быстрее. В статье показано, почему такой вывод может быть неверным. Предложена простая схема исследования влияния текущей экономической политики на достижение политического равновесия, а косвенно — на будущие экономические результаты. Механизмы такого воздействия иллюстрируются на примерах. Авторы считают, что надежная экономическая политика должна быть основана на тщательном политико-экономическом анализе и учитывать воздействие политико-экономических факторов на достижение политического равновесия в будущем.
Об авторах
Д. Асемоглу
Массачусетский технологический институт (Кембридж, Массачусетс, США)
Соединённые Штаты Америки
проф. экономики, Массачусетский технологический институт (Кембридж, Массачусетс, США)
Соединённые Штаты Америки
проф. экономики, Массачусетский технологический институт (Кембридж, Массачусетс, США)
Д. А. Робинсон
Гарвардский университет (Кембридж, Массачусетс, США)
Соединённые Штаты Америки
проф. политологии, Гарвардский университет (Кембридж, Массачусетс, США)
Соединённые Штаты Америки
проф. политологии, Гарвардский университет (Кембридж, Массачусетс, США)
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Рецензия
Для цитирования:
Асемоглу Д., Робинсон Д.А. Политика или экономика? Ловушки стандартных решений. Вопросы экономики. 2013;(12):4-28. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2013-12-4-28
For citation:
Acemoglu D., Robinson J. Economics versus politics: pitfalls of policy advice. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2013;(12):4-28. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2013-12-4-28
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