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Liberal Political Economy And Philosophy Of James Buchanan
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2013-11-34-52
Abstract
The article examines the scientific legacy of the Nobel Prize-winning economist James Buchanan (1919—2013). The focus is on the evolution of his views on constitutional political economy. The article shows the displacement of Buchanan’s preferences from the expansion of inclusiveness of collective choice rules and the number of constitutional constraints to the generality principle — a non-discriminatory democracy as a means to counteract majoritarian democracy failures. It is concluded that finally Buchanan adopted radical subjectivism of the Austrian economic school and post-Keynesianism embodied in the concept of constitutionally limited evolution.
Keywords
Buchanan,
constitutional political economy,
contractarianism,
generality principle,
constitutionally limited evolution
JEL: B25; B31; B40
About the Author
A. Zaostrovtsev
National Research University Higher School of Economics — St. Petersburg (St. Petersburg, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
References
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For citations:
Zaostrovtsev A. Liberal Political Economy And Philosophy Of James Buchanan. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2013;(11):34-52. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2013-11-34-52
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