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Government Support Policy of the russian Enterprises During the 2008—2009 Crisis: Criteria of Treating the Companies as “Strategic”
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2013-6-84-99
Abstract
Support of individual enterprises was an important part of anti-crisis policy of Russian government during 2008—2009. The officially declared goal of this support was maintaining sustainability of “systemically important”, or strategic enterprises. Using regression analysis, the author seeks to determine the extent to which inclusion in the The List of strategic organizations approved by the Government Commission on sustainable development of the Russian economy in December 2008 was defined by the social significance of the company or by its affiliation with one of the 16 largest Russian business groups.
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Review
For citations:
Kislitsyn D. Government Support Policy of the russian Enterprises During the 2008—2009 Crisis: Criteria of Treating the Companies as “Strategic”. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2013;(6):84-99. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2013-6-84-99
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