

Modularization and control in governance structures of digital platforms: A case study of ride-hailing platforms
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2025-4-55-93
Abstract
The variety of hybrid governance structures has attracted the attention of researchers for many years. “Creative destruction” of markets under the influence of digital platforms increases the relevance of analyzing the process of transformation. Based on the results of the empirical study in 2022—2024, the transformation of the value creation organization in the market of taxi services in Russia has been described. The article also analyzes changes in the structure of the main participants in this industry and their functions. It is shown that the most important factor in the transformation of the Russian taxi services market was the change of governance structures based on the modularization of value chain components, which excludes their functioning outside the control of the digital platform. The importance of digital technologies in the process of creative destruction should not be overestimated: new platform models of governance and control are the main tool of market transformation.
Keywords
JEL: D22, D26, L14, L22
About the Author
I. Z. GeliskhanovRussian Federation
Islam Z. Geliskhanov
Moscow
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For citations:
Geliskhanov I.Z. Modularization and control in governance structures of digital platforms: A case study of ride-hailing platforms. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2025;(4):55-93. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2025-4-55-93