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Влиятельные индивиды: подходы к моделированию
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2018-9-114-131
Аннотация
В статье рассматриваются теоретические и экспериментальные подходы к моделированию социальных взаимодействий. Общение и обмен информацией с другими людьми влияют на поведение человека в разных сферах жизни. В основном такое влияние оказывают лидеры, выдающиеся индивиды , обладающие высоким социальным статусом или экспертными знаниями. Социальные взаимодействия исследуются в моделях социального обучения, теоретико-игровых моделях, моделях конформности и др. Не хватает формальных моделей асимметричных взаимодействий, с помощью которых можно выделить объективные характеристики, отражающие высокий социальный статус индивида и его восприятие другими, а также показать влияние лидера на других людей и проанализировать механизм этого влияния.
Ключевые слова
социальное взаимодействие,
социальное обучение,
экспериментальная экономика,
теоретико-игровой анализ
JEL: C9; C72; C73; D82; D83; D85; D91; G41; H41
Об авторе
О. Ю. Бондаренко
Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики».
Россия
Россия
Бондаренко Оксана Юрьевна, аспирант Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая школа экономики».
Москва.
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Рецензия
Для цитирования:
Бондаренко О.Ю. Влиятельные индивиды: подходы к моделированию. Вопросы экономики. 2018;(9):114-131. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2018-9-114-131
For citation:
Bondarenko O.Yu. Influential individuals: Approach to modeling. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2018;(9):114-131. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2018-9-114-131
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