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Meso-institutions for digital ecosystems
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2023-2-61-82
Abstract
The importance of digital ecosystems in the economy is growing rapidly as more and more companies and consumers are involved in their circuit. At the same time, the regulation relevance is growing too, as evidenced by many antitrust cases involving companies such as Yandex, Google, Microsoft, which constitute the core of the respective ecosystems. The very concept of digital ecosystems does not have a generally accepted definition. However, national and supranational regulators must resolve disputes between the leader of the ecosystem and the complementary companies, as well as protect the interests of an indefinite number of persons (with the application of antitust law). Such disputes resolution leads to the fact that the regulator has to make decisions about the rules of interaction within the complex structure of relationships between all participants in ecosystems, de facto defining a framework for establishing institutional agreements. This paper proposes to apply the concept of “meso-institution” for some ecosystems rules, separating them from both hybrid institutional agreements (micro-level rules) and the institutional environment (macro-level rules). It is assumed that meso-institutions are a key element for digital ecosystems successful development. Using the example of companies and antitrust cases, the formation and evolution of meso-institutions, the capability of their design, and the regulator’s role are shown. The application of the meso-institutions concept makes it possible to justify the shift of focus of antitrust regulation in the field of digital ecosystems towards their self-regulation rather than strengthening legislative regulation.
Supporting agencies: The article is prepared under RANEPA state assignment.
About the Authors
A. E. Shastitko
Lomonosov Moscow State University; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Moscow
A. A. Kurdin
Lomonosov Moscow State University; HSE University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Moscow
I. N. Filippova
Lomonosov Moscow State University;
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Moscow
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For citations:
Shastitko A.E., Kurdin A.A., Filippova I.N. Meso-institutions for digital ecosystems. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2023;(2):61-82. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2023-2-61-82
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