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State-owned company: Detection Zone of Government Failure or market Failure?
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2015-1-45-79
Abstract
This article analyzes state-owned companies and their place in the structure of market interactions in the context of modern approaches to the study of government failures and market failures, as well as the conditions of the system of private property rights rooting. Besides the general theoretical consideration of the costs of functioning of state-owned companies, the authors refer to the specific experience of the Russian economy, consistently analyzing the opportunities and palliatives of the current privatization policy, the experience of establishment and the risks of functioning of state corporations. Particular attention is paid to the problem of limited motivation to improve the institutional environment in general and, on the contrary, the expansion of the practice of direct government intervention in order to solve the problems of economic development. The authors also consider specific areas where there is a restriction of private property rights in connection with the expansion of the public sector, de jure and de facto.
Keywords
public enterprises,
privatization,
government failures,
market failures,
political markets,
government regulation,
allocative efficiency,
property rights
JEL: B20, D20, D60, K40, L30, P20
About the Authors
A. Radygin
Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy (Moscow, Russia); Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Y. Simachev
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (Moscow, Russia); Inter-Departmental Analytical Center (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
R. Entov
Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Radygin A., Simachev Y., Entov R. State-owned company: Detection Zone of Government Failure or market Failure? Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2015;(1):45-79. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2015-1-45-79
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