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Citation metrics: To refuse or use?
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2023-2-116-126
Abstract
The article analyzes the use of bibliometric indicators to evaluate the work of scientists. We answer the question of why bibliometric assessments of scientific work have become so widespread in recent decades; also, we consider the pros and cons of such assessments from the point of view of public welfare. The paper gives recommendations for reforming the current system of assessing the effectiveness of scientific work. It is necessary to minimize reporting on publications and citations and not create conditions for a race in the number of citations and articles. Since citations of scientific papers have a delay, the assessment of published articles based on bibliometrics should have a lag of 1 to 5 years, depending on the research area. Publication in a scientific journal should not be the only form of presenting the results of scientific work: conference reports, reports (including grants), monographs, etc. must also be taken into account. For effective organization of science, formal rules alone are not sufficient; informal institutions are no less important, primarily the institution of scientific reputation. In order to stimulate its development in the Russian scientific community, we offer using the formal institution of vicarious liability — the responsibility of employers for violations of employees. Liability, in this case, means the dependence of state funding of an organization on violations of scientific ethics committed by its researchers. Finally, it is necessary to reinforce the significance of the institution of peer review, making this process more public.
Keywords
scientific research efficiency evaluation,
scientometrics,
bibliometric indicators,
scientific reputation
JEL: D83, I23
About the Authors
I. E. Kalabikhina
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Moscow
G. V. Kalyagin
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Moscow
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Kalabikhina I.E., Kalyagin G.V. Citation metrics: To refuse or use? Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2023;(2):116-126. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2023-2-116-126
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