Открытый доступ
Только для подписчиков
Когда идеи важнее интересов: предпочтения, взгляды на мир и инновации в экономической политике
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2015-1-22-44
Аннотация
В статье показано, что взаимосвязь интересов агентов и наблюдаемых процессов в политико-экономическом контексте зависит от многочисленных неявных предпосылок об имеющихся у агентов идеях по поводу того, что они максимизируют, как устроен мир; и по поводу набора инструментов, которыми они располагают, чтобы реализовывать свои интересы. Эти идеи сами могут быть объектом как манипуляций, так и инноваций, становясь тем самым частью политической игры. Существует прямая аналогия между изобретательской деятельностью в секторе новых технологий и инвестициями в убеждения и инновациями в экономической политике. Особый акцент сделан на моделях, с помощью которых экономисты пытаются объяснить экономическую неэффективность.
Об авторе
Д. Родрик
Школа общественных наук Института перспективных исследований (Принстон, США)
Соединённые Штаты Америки
профессор Школы общественных наук Института перспективных исследований (Принстон, США)
Соединённые Штаты Америки
профессор Школы общественных наук Института перспективных исследований (Принстон, США)
Список литературы
1. Rodrik D. (2014). When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, Worldviews, and Policy Innovations. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 189-208
2. Acemoglu D. (2003). Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics. Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 620-652.
3. Acemoglu D., Chernozhukov V., Yildiz M. (2009). Fragility of Asymptotic Agreement under Bayesian Learning. Unpublished paper, February. http://economics.mit.edu/ files/3795.
4. Acemoglu D., Robinson J. A. (2006). Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective. American Political Science Review, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 115-131.
5. Acemoglu D., Robinson J. A. (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. N. Y.: Crown.
6. Acemoglu D., Robinson J. A. (2013). Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 173-192.
7. Асемоглу Д., Робинсон Дж. (2013). Политика или экономика? Ловушки стандартных решений. Вопросы экономики. № 12. С. 4-28.
8. Aghion Ph., Howitt P. (1998). Endogenous Growth Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
9. Akerlof G. A., Kranton R. E. (2000). Economics and Identity. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115, No. 3, pp. 715-753.
10. Akerlof G. A., Kranton R. E. (2005). Identity and the Economics of Organizations. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 9-32.
11. Alesina A., Cozzi G., Mantovan N. (2012). The Evolution of Ideology, Fairness and Redistribution. Economic Journal, Vol. 122, No. 565, pp. 1244-1261.
12. Alesina A., Rosenthal H. (1995). Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. Andrews M. (2013). The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions. N. Y.: Cambridge University Press.
14. Atran S., Ginges J. (2012). Religious and Sacred Imperatives in Human Conflict. Science, Vol. 336, No. 6083, pp. 855-857.
15. Bates R. H. (1981). Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
16. Béland D., Cox R. H. (eds.). (2011). Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research. N. Y.: Oxford University Press.
17. Blyth M. (2002). Institutions and Ideas. In: Marsh D., Stoker G. (ed.) Theory and Methods in Political Science. London: Macmillan, pp. 292-311.
18. Blyth M. (2007). Powering, Puzzling, or Persuading? The Mechanisms of Building Institutional Orders. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 761-777.
19. Blyth M. (2011). Ideas, Uncertainty, and Evolution. Chap. 4. In: Béland D., Cox R. H. (eds.). Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research. N. Y.: Oxford University Press.
20. DellaVigna S., Kaplan E. (2007). The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 122, No. 3, pp. 1187-1234.
21. Denzau A. T., North D. C. (1994). Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions. Kyklos, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 3-31.
22. Destler I. M. (2005). American Trade Politics. 4th ed. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
23. DiMaggio P. J., Powell W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 147-160.
24. Dixit A. K. (1996). The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
25. Dixit A. K., Weibull J. (2007). Political Polarization. PNAS, Vol. 104, No. 18, pp. 7351-7356.
26. Elster J. (2000). Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition. American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 3, pp. 685-695.
27. Fernandez R., Rodrik D. (1991). Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty. American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 5, pp. 1145-1155.
28. Goldsmith J. L., Posner E. A. (2005). The Limits of International Law. Oxford; N. Y.: Oxford University Press.
29. Grossman G. M., Helpman E. (1994). Protection for Sale. American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 4, pp. 833-850.
30. Hammond P. J. (1979). Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 263-282.
31. Hay C. (2011). Ideas and the Construction of Interests. Ch. 4. In: Béland D., Cox R. H. Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
32. Howse R. (2013). Thucydides and Just War: How to Begin to Read Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 17-24.
33. Inman R. P., Rubinfeld D. L. (2012). Federal Institutions and the Democratic Transition: Learning from South Africa. Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 783-817.
34. Johnson S., Kwak J. (2010). 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown. N. Y.: Pantheon Books.
35. Krueger A. O. (1974). The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. American Economic Review, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 291-303.
36. Krueger A. O. (1997). Trade Policy and Economic Development: How We Learn. American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 1-22.
37. Laffont J.-J., Tirole J. (1991). The Politics of Government Decision Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 4, pp. 1089-1127.
38. Lau L. J., Qian Y., Roland G. (2000). Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China’s Dual-Track Approach to Transition. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 1, pp. 120-143.
39. Leighton W., López E. (2013). Madmen, Intellectuals, and Academic Scribblers: The Economic Engine of Political Change. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
40. Leitzel J. (2003). The Political Economy of Rule Evasion and Policy Reform. London; N. Y.: Routledge.
41. Mehta P. B., Walton M. (2012). India’s Political Settlement and Development Path. Unpublished paper, December.
42. Mukand S. W., Rodrik D. (2005). In Search of the Holy Grail: Policy Convergence, Experimentation, and Economic Performance. American Economic Review, Vol. 95, No. 1, pp. 374-383.
43. Nelson R. R., Winter S. G. (2002). Evolutionary Theorizing in Economics. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 23-46.
44. Olson M. (1993). Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3, pp. 567-576.
45. Pande R. (2011). Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income Democracies. Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 3. Р. 215-237.
46. Peltzman S. (1976). Toward a More General Theory of Regulation. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 211-240.
47. Rodrik D. (1994). The Rush to Free Trade in the Developing World: Why So Late? Why Now? Will It Last? Ch. 3. In: Haggard S., Webb S. B. (eds.). Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment. N. Y.: Oxford University Press for the World Bank.
48. Rodrik D. (1995). The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Ch. 28. In: Grossman G. M., Rogoff K. (eds.). Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 3. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
49. Roosevelt F. D. (1932). Oglethorpe University Commencement Address. May 22. http:// newdeal.feri.org/speeches/1932d.htm.
50. Ruggie J. G. (1998). What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge. International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 855-885.
51. Schultz Th. W. (1964). Transforming Traditional Agriculture. New Haven: Yale University Press.
52. Segerstrom P. S., Anant T. C. A., Dinopoulos E. (1990). A Schumpeterian Model of the Product Life. American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 5, pp. 1077-1091.
53. Sen A. (2006). Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny. N. Y.: W. W. Norton.
54. Sørensen J. B., Stuart T. E. (2000). Aging, Obsolescence, and Organizational Innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 81-112.
55. Stigler G. J. (1971). The Theory of Economic Regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 3-21.
56. Wendt A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press. Weyland K. (2008). Toward a New Theory of Institutional Change. World Politics, Vol. 60, No. 2, pp. 281-314.
57. Yanagizawa-Drott D. (2014). Propaganda and Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide. Quarterly Journal of Economics. August 21. doi: 10.1093/ qje/qju020.
Рецензия
Для цитирования:
Родрик Д. Когда идеи важнее интересов: предпочтения, взгляды на мир и инновации в экономической политике. Вопросы экономики. 2015;(1):22-44. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2015-1-22-44
For citation:
Rodrik D. When ideas trump interests: Preferences, Worldviews, and Policy innovations. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2015;(1):22-44. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2015-1-22-44
Просмотров: 623
Послать статью по эл. почте 