

Paternalistic state: Academic science and scientific journals
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2022-9-139-157
Abstract
The paper is prefaced by the statement that a paternalistic state was not invented by anyone and is a result of an endogenous process of society development, at different phases of which the state can generate both positive and negative consequences. In this context, the paper justifies the fallacy of the state’s decision to reorganize the Russian Academy of Sciences by escalating bureaucratic interference in scientific life — using scientometric management methods and introducing an “effective contract” that brought forth a “waterfall” of worthless articles and predatory journals. In order to eliminate “scientometric failure” the paper proposes recommendations on science reforming based on principally new view on the processes of knowledge production as a public good and its transformation into market products with an emphasis on one of the branches of this transformation — scientific articles publication. The theoretical result has served as a platform for the development of institutional modernization of the knowledge distribution system, according to which the authors for an appropriate fee may grant the right to use their scientific texts for publication in journals. The revenues of journals should come from two sources: the sale of journals at market prices consistent with the individual utility of publishing products, and a budget subsidy consistent with the social utility of journals’ knowledge dissemination services. The implementation of this reform implies state funding of scientific journals and targeted subsidies to scientific libraries of universities and academic institutions to pay for subscriptions to major scientific journals.
About the Author
A. Y. RubinsteinRussian Federation
Alexander Y. Rubinstein
Moscow
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For citations:
Rubinstein A.Y. Paternalistic state: Academic science and scientific journals. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2022;(9):139-157. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2022-9-139-157