|Generate QR code
Open Access
Subscription Access
“Unorthodox” fast-growing firms (gazelles) and North’s limited access order
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2018-3-80-101
Abstract
The subject of the article is “unorthodox” gazelles - politically-connected or big business-affiliated fast-growing firms. It is established that rents play a significant role in the commercial success of such firms. Nevertheless, as predicted by the well-known “limited access framework” (by D. North and co-authors), and contrary to the standard interpretation of rents, the latter can play a positive role in the transitional economy. The authors have identified on empirical material some clearly positive scenarios among the main patterns of the development of “unorthodox” gazelles in Russia. The article discusses the conditions under which “unorthodox” gazelles can become an instrument of developmental state.
Keywords
fast-growing firms,
gazelles,
politically connected business,
affiliated gazelles,
limited access order,
Douglass North
JEL: D21; D72; D74; O17
About the Authors
A. Yu. Yudanov
Financial University under the Government of RF
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
A. A. Yakovlev
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
References
1. Volkov V. V. (2002). Violent entrepreneurship. Moscow: Letniy Sad. (In Russian).
2. Medovnikov D., Oganesyan T., Rozmirovich S. (2016). Candidates for the championship: Medium-sized high growth companies and state-run programs for their support. Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 8, pp. 50—66. (In Russian).
3. Orekhovskiy P. A. (2012). The role of fear in economic behavior today and after the triumph of democracy. Mir Rossii, No. 3, pp. 65—79. (In Russian).
4. Polunin Yu. A., Yudanov A. Yu. (2016). Russia’s high-growth companies: Tested through depression. Mir Novoy Ekonomiki, No. 2, pp. 103—112. (In Russian).
5. Stanovaya T. (2017). Transformation of Putin’s elites: 2014—2024. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center. (In Russian).
6. Yudanov A. Yu. (2008). The experience of competition in Russia: The reasons for success and failure. 2nd ed., rev. and enl. Moscow: KNORUS. (In Russian).
7. Yudanov A. Yu. (2010). Embodiments of entrepreneurial spirit: “Gazelle-firms” in Russia. Journal of the New Economic Association, No. 5, pp. 91—108. (In Russian).
8. Yakovlev A. A. (2012a). Communist beliefs and their influence on social and economic development: The application of a new approach by D. North to historical experience of the Soviet Union. Mir Rossii, No. 4, pp. 154—167. (In Russian).
9. Yakovlev A. (2012b). How to reduce violent pressure on business in Russia? Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 11, pp. 4—23. (In Russian).
10. Amsden A. H. (1989). Asia’s next giant: South Korea and late industrialization. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
11. Azam J.-P. (2014). The birth of a democracy: Homegrown bicameralism in Somaliland. Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 245-266.
12. Baumol W. J. (1990). Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive, and destructive. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 5, Part 1, pp. 893-921.
13. Besouw van B., Ansink E., Bavel van B. (2015). The economics of the limited access order. MPRA Paper, No. 65574.
14. Birch D. L. (1987). Job creation America. How our smallest companies put the most people to work. New York: Free Press.
15. Birch D., Medoff J. (1994). Gazelles. In: L. C. Solomon, A. R. Levenson (eds.). Labor markets, employment policy, and job creation. Boulder, CO and London: Westview Press, pp. 159-168.
16. Coad A., Daunfeldt S. O., Hölzl W., Johansson D., Nightingale P. (2014). High-growth firms: Introduction to the special section. Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 91-112.
17. Delmar F., Davidsson P., Gartner W. B. (2003). Arriving at the high-growth firm. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 189-216.
18. Faccio M. (2006). Politically connected firms. American Economic Review, Vol. 96, No. 1, pp. 369-386.
19. Faccio M. (2010). Differences between politically connected and nonconnected firms: A cross-country analysis. Financial Management, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 905-928.
20. Firestone T. (2010). Armed injustice: Abuse of the law and complex crime in post-Soviet Russia. Denver Journal of International Law & Policy, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 555-580.
21. Fisman R. (2001). Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 4, pp. 1095-1102.
22. Kazun A. (2015). Violent corporate raiding in Russia: Preconditions and protective factors. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 459-484.
23. Luong P. J., Weinthal E. (2004). Contra coercion: Russian tax reform, exogenous shocks, and negotiated institutional change. American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 1, pp. 139-152.
24. North D., Wallis J., Weingast B. (2009). Violence and social orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
25. North D., Wallis J., Webb S., Weingast B. (eds.) (2013). In the shadow of violence: Politics, economics, and the problems of development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
26. Piazza M., Austrian Z., Lendel I., Alexander S., Cyran E., Hoover D., Leach R. (2016). High-growth firms: Delineating definitions, industries, and business cycle performance. Urban Publications Paper, No. 1369.
27. Robinson N. (2013). “Natural” states and the development of democracy. In: L. E. Grinin, A. V. Korotayev (eds.). Evolution: Development within big history, evolutionary and world-system paradigms. Volgograd: Uchitel.
28. Rochlitz M. (2014). Corporate raiding and the role of the state in Russia. Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2-3, pp. 89-114.
29. Szakonyi D. (2017). Businesspeople in elected office: Identifying private benefits from firm-level returns. (Working Paper No. IIEP-WP-2017-20). Institute for International Economic Policy, George Washington University.
30. Volkov V. V. (1999). Violent entrepreneurship in post-communist Russia. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 5, pp. 741-754.
31. Webb S. (2015). Becoming an open democratic capitalist society: A two-century historical perspective on Germany’s evolving political economy. Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 19-37.
32. Wegner G. (2015). Capitalist transformation without political participation: German capitalism in the first half of the nineteenth century. Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 61-86.
33. Yakovlev A. (2014). Russian modernization: Between the need for new players and the fear of losing control of rent sources. Journal of Eurasian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 10-20.
34. Yakovlev A. (2016). What is Russia trying to defend? Russian Journal of Economics, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 146-161.
35. You J.-S. (2013). Transition from a limited access order to an open access order: The case of South Korea. In: D. North, J. Wallis, S. Webb, B. Weingast (eds.). In the shadow of violence: Politics, economics, and the problems of development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, рp. 293-327.
36. Yudanov A. (2014). High-growth LMT firms and the evolution of the Russian economy. In: H. Hirsch-Kreinsen, I. Schwinge (eds). Knowledge-intensive entrepreneurship in low-tech industries. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 117-137.
37. Zweynert J. (2015). The concept of Ordnungspolitik through the lens of the theory of limited and open access orders. Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 4-18.
Review
For citations:
Yudanov A.Yu., Yakovlev A.A. “Unorthodox” fast-growing firms (gazelles) and North’s limited access order. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2018;(3):80-101. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2018-3-80-101
Views:
1370
Email this article 
