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Chimera of domestic antitrust: Institution of collective dominance in Russia
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2021-7-68-88
Abstract
The paper defines the features of the collective dominance institute in Russia as well as the relation between collective dominance and oligopoly in the spheres of law and economic theory. The article evaluates the grounds and consequences of the collective dominance legal norm application; it suggests an approach to examining the relation between effects and expected results of this legal norm application and outlines the potential ways to harmonize the best international practices of the collective dominance norm application with the existing economic standards of product market analysis for the purpose of competition law enforcement. Results of the oligopoly theory and the Russian version of collective dominance institution key elements comparison show: the collective dominance institution concept is inadequately applied to identify individual abuse of dominant position due to possible law enforcement errors. The Russian version of collective dominance institution reflects one fundamental tendency intrinsic to Russian antitrust: examined more closely, law enforcement, which is de jure aimed at protecting competition, appears to be economic regulation, which de facto can lead to competition restriction. One of the possible structural alternatives for the collective dominance institution reforming is based on presumption of the need to analyze the joint impact exerted by a group of undertakings on the market.
About the Authors
A. E. Shastitko
Lomonosov Moscow State University;
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration,
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Andrey E. Shastitko
Moscow
K. A. Ionkina
Lomonosov Moscow State University;
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration,
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Karina A. Ionkina
Moscow
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Shastitko A.E., Ionkina K.A. Chimera of domestic antitrust: Institution of collective dominance in Russia. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2021;(7):68-88. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2021-7-68-88
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