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The principles of auction theory (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences 2020)
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2021-1-5-32
Abstract
Auction theory is the core of modern economic theory, and standard auctions are the basic elements of many models in microeconomics, public economics, and finance. Theoretical studies of auctions have shaped the modern understanding of the economic role of information in competitive market, and of price theory. Applied analysis of auctions has underpinned important practical mechanisms — for example, mechanisms of privatization and re-privatization of electromagnetic spectrum and public procurement. The 2020 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded to Robert Wilson and Paul Milgrom both for their contributions to the foundations of auction theory and for the development of largescale practical applications.
About the Author
K. I. Sonin
University of Chicago;
HSE University
United States
United States
Konstantin I. Sonin
Chicago, IL;
Moscow
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Review
For citations:
Sonin K.I. The principles of auction theory (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences 2020). Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2021;(1):5-32. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2021-1-5-32
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