Спрятанные «дыры» в капитале еще не обанкротившихся российских банков: оценка масштаба возможных потерь
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2017-7-42-61
Аннотация
Ключевые слова
JEL: G21; P23; P34; P52
Об авторе
М. Е. МамоновРоссия
к. э. н., руководитель группы банковских исследований ЦМАКП; н. с. ИНП РАН, с. н. с. НИУ ВШЭ (Москва)
Список литературы
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Рецензия
Для цитирования:
Мамонов М.Е. Спрятанные «дыры» в капитале еще не обанкротившихся российских банков: оценка масштаба возможных потерь. Вопросы экономики. 2017;(7):42-61. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2017-7-42-61
For citation:
Mamonov M. Hidden “holes” in the capital of not yet failed banks in Russia: An estimate of the scope of potential losses. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2017;(7):42-61. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2017-7-42-61