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Теория игр в экономической науке и не только
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2017-5-89-115
Аннотация
В статье рассматривается история превращения теории игр в стандартный инструмент экономической науки и утверждается, что первоначальный ажиотаж вокруг теории игр исчез не потому, что этот предмет сдал свой исходный «плацдарм», а потому, что его влияние распространилось на всю экономическую науку. Дано описание развития теории игр, особое внимание обращается на ее интеграцию в экономическую теорию, в ходе которой изменилась как практика экономической науки, так и природа теории игр. Рассмотрены некоторые проблемы современной теории игр - работа со множественными равновесиями, необходимость сделать теорию игр полезной для приложений и лучше интегрировать некооперативную и кооперативную теории игр. Представлены текущее состояние и перспективы этой дисциплины.
Об авторе
Л. Самуэльсон
Йельский университет
Соединённые Штаты Америки
проф. экономики Йельского университета (Нью-Хейвен, США)
Соединённые Штаты Америки
проф. экономики Йельского университета (Нью-Хейвен, США)
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Для цитирования:
Самуэльсон Л. Теория игр в экономической науке и не только. Вопросы экономики. 2017;(5):89-115. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2017-5-89-115
For citation:
Samuelson L. Game theory in economics and beyond. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2017;(5):89-115. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2017-5-89-115
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