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A model of preferences evolution

https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-8-82-94

Abstract

The paper examines the evolution of individual political preferences under the influence of the parties and political groups of which they are members. Individual preferences are considered in terms of proximity to political doctrines of the political institutions in question. The change in political views can be considered as a combination of a steady trend with the imposition of random change, and in this sense it is similar to mutations in biology. The paper shows that stationary distributions of individuals on the political spectrum scale are defined by their utility functions and initial numbers. While the initial distribution was generated by membership of the central party and two groups conventionally called “left” and “right”, the stationary distribution has the form of three narrow peaks, the maximums of which are at the points characterizing political doctrines on the political spectrum scale. In addition, it is shown that in the stationary mode, the relative number of members of the “center” party will increase as compared to the initial period, and vice versa, the total share of “left” and “right” will decrease.

About the Authors

K. A. Bukin
http://www.hse.ru
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation

Kirill A. Bukin

Moscow



M. I. Levin
http://www.hse.ru
National Research University Higher School of Economics; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Russian Federation

Mark I. Levin

Moscow



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Review

For citations:


Bukin K.A., Levin M.I. A model of preferences evolution. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2020;(8):82-94. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-8-82-94

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ISSN 0042-8736 (Print)